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Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (2005)1 
 
CONSTRUCTION DEFECT—CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION, 
ATTORNEY FEES, AND PREJUDGEMENT INTEREST 
 
Summary 
 
 Beazer Homes constructed and sold 206 single-family residences between 1994 
and 1999 on a 40-acre residential subdivision.  In April 2000, three homeowners, 
individually, and as proposed class representatives, filed a complaint against Beazer 
Homes alleging constructional defects to their homes.  The complaint alleged that their 
houses’ foundations and concrete slabs were damaged by expansive soils, a condition in 
which the soils beneath a house expand when exposed to water and contract when the soil 
dries.  This condition can cause a house’s foundation and concreted slab to crack and 
separate.  The plaintiffs also alleged over 30 additional constructional defects unrelated to 
the soils condition. 
 
 Four months after the complaint was filed the first district court judge granted 
class certification without conducting a NRCP 23 analysis.  Following considerable 
discovery, Beazer Homes sought decertification of the homeowners’ class action.  Beazer 
Homes argued that certification was granted with respect to the common question of 
expansive soils, however, subsequent discovery demonstrated that a number of houses 
were not impacted by expansive soils and that individualized proof for the cause of 
expansive soils was required because of grading, landscaping, changes to drainage, lot 
slopes, grade preparation and retaining walls.  The district court judge denied 
decertification. 
 
 During trial, Beazer renewed its motion to decertify.  Again, the district court 
judge denied the motion with no NRCP 23 analysis.  A jury returned a verdict for the 
homeowners in the sum of $7,885,500.  Thereafter, the homeowners sought attorney fees 
pursuant to NRS 40.655.  Beazer Homes objected claiming that the subject of attorney’s 
fees should have been presented to the jury.  The district court awarded attorney fees and 
prejudgment interest. 
 
 The Supreme Court agreed with Beazer Homes and held that class action 
certification was inappropriate under NRCP 23.  NRCP 23(a) and (b) specify the 
circumstances under which a case is appropriately designated and maintained as a class 
action.  Under NRCP 23(a), plaintiffs seeking class action certification must satisfy four 
prerequisites: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, (4) adequacy.2  In addition 
                                                 
1 Commentary by Joshua Benson 
2 Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (2005) (“’Numerosity’ prerequisite 
requires that the members of the proposed class be so numerous that separate joinder is 
impracticable…’Commonality’ prerequisite necessitates the existence of questions of law or fact common 
to each member of the class…Typicality prerequisite class for a showing that the representative parties’ 
claims or defenses are typical of the class’s claims or defenses…Adequacy prerequisite mandates that the 
representative parties be able to fairly and adequately protect and represent each class member’s interests”). 
to meeting NRCP 23(a), plaintiffs must meet one of the three conditions set forth in 
NRCP 23(b): (1) that separate litigation by individuals in the class would create a risk 
that the opposing party would be held to inconsistent standards of conduct or that 
nonparty members interests might be unfairly impacted by the other members’ individual 
litigation; (2) that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act against the class 
in a manner making appropriate classwide injunctive or declaratory relief; or (3) that 
common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions , and a class 
action is superior to other methods of adjudication.  Here, the homeowners advanced 
their class action based upon the third condition of NRCP 23(b) 
 
 The district court abused its discretion by not conducting a thorough NRCP 23 
analysis.  First, individualized proof of the cause and defenses to the expansive soils 
claims was necessary.  Second, the district court allowed other claims to be adjudicated 
even though the class action certification only applied to the expansive soils issue. And 
third, the court failed to conduct a thorough NRCP 23 analysis even when it became 
apparent that class action certification was problematic.  A thorough NRCP 23 analysis 
would have demonstrated that class action was inappropriate. 
 
 Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court held that claimants may recover attorney 
fees as an item of damages under NRS 40.655(1)(a).  “Thus, any time that a case is tried 
by legal counsel and a jury determines that the claimant is entitled to recover damages 
proximately caused by a constructional defect, a court can presume that the claimant is 
entitled to the recovery of attorney fees, whether or not the jury verdict explicitly so 
states.”3  The method for determining the fees to be awarded is at the discretion of the 
court which is tempered by reason and fairness.  However, the court must use the factors 
enumerated in Brunzel v. Golden Gate National Bank:4 the advocate’s professional 
qualities, the nature of the litigation, the work performed, and the result. 
 
 Finally, the Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest was properly awarded 
on the entire verdict because the award represented only past damages.  Prejudgment 
interest may not be awarded on an entire verdict where it is impossible to determine what 
part of the verdict represents past damages and what part represents future damages.  
Here, all the damages were past damages “because the damages occurred when the 
homes were built, regardless of when the homeowners actually made or will make 
necessary repairs.”5 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
 Is class action certification appropriate in constructional defect cases involving 
single-family residences? 
 
                                                 
3 Id. at 33-34 (citing Murphey v. Stowe Club Highlands, 761 A.2d 688, 699-702 (Vt. 2000)). 
4 Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345 (1969). 
5 Shuette, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (2005). 
Disposition 
 
 Generally no.  Single-family residence constructional defect litigation often raises 
diverse, individualized claims and defenses, which results in the requirements for class 
action certification not being met.  However, class action may be appropriate “if the 
construction defect case or issue involves a singular defect that predominates over any 
other problems, which remain minimal.”6 
 
Commentary 
 
State of law before Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp. 
 
 Before Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp. the law in this area was governed 
by NRCP 23.  However, class action applicability in construction defect cases was 
unclear. 
 
Effect of Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp. on Current Law 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed with the district court and held that class 
action certification was inappropriate in this construction defect case.  It held that the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct and document a thorough 
NRCP 23 analysis. 
  
Even with a NRCP 23 analysis, the Nevada Supreme Court essentially ruled that 
construction defect cases are rarely adequate for class action certification.  Where 
specific parcels of land are concerned, the unique characteristics of the land weigh 
heavily in favor of requiring independent litigation to determine the liability of each 
parcel and its owner.  Additionally, when the uniqueness of land is not implicated, 
constructional defect cases relating to several properties are often very complex and 
involve different levels or types of property damages.  These cases often present issues of 
causation, liability defenses, and damages that cannot be determined in class actions, but 
require each party to individually substantiate their claims. 
 
There are few construction defect cases that may survive a thorough NRCP 23 
analysis, but the district court needs to go through that analysis to determine if a class 
action suit is appropriate. 
 
Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The court’s conclusion that construction defect litigation is generally not 
appropriate for class action certification is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions.  
The California Supreme Court has held that class actions involving real property “are 
                                                 
6 Id. at 24 (see Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp., 107 Cal Rptr.2d 761 (Ct. App. 2001) (class action 
was permissible because the alleged defect consisted of the improper use of a certain material used in each 
house’s concrete slab). 
often incompatible with the fundamental maxim that each parcel of land is unique”.7  A 
federal district court in North Carolina held recognized that any recovery in class action 
cases often “implicate[s] myriad of ‘house specific’ issues.”8  For these reasons, courts in 
other jurisdictions rarely certify class actions.9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada established that class action certification in 
construction defect cases is rarely appropriate.  In the few cases that it is appropriate, the 
district court must conduct a thorough NRCP 23 analysis.  Additionally, the Court held 
that attorney’s fees are damages to be determined by the judge and prejudgment interest 
is properly awarded where the damage has already occurred even though the specific 
claims for the damages have not been submitted. 
 
 
                                                 
7 City of San Jose v. Superior Ct., 525 P.2d 701, 711 (Cal. 1974). 
8 In re Stucco Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 210, 215 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (analyzing a request to certify a nationwide 
class of homeowners). 
9 See Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp., 107 Cal Rptr.2d 761 (Ct. App. 2001); see also Simeon v. 
Colley Homes Inc., 818 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that predominate individual issues of 
causation are not amenable to class action certification); see also Basurco v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 133 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 367, 373 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the denial of class action status in cases involving earthquake 
damages because the existence, cause, and extent of property damages and any recovery would necessarily 
have to be determined “on a case-by case basis”); see also Brown v. New Orleans Service Inc., 506 So. 2d 
621 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing class action certification in a utilities power interruption case because 
rights of plaintiffs were not of sufficient common character with rights of members of proposed class of 
ratepayers to warrant class certification). 
